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ABSTRACT
, Economic models of information value have had little impact on the
theory and practice of MIS. This is due in part to difficulties in
operationalizing these models, but more importantly, it is due to
problems in the theory that stem from descriptively invalid assump-
tions. This paper examines those assumptions and reviews five
major areas for modification: the decision process, human judgment
under uncertainty, the choice of actions, multiple information signal
resolution, and multiple decisions over time. Incorporation of valid
descriptive assumptions in the economic theory wi I I move the field
toward a behaviorally grounded theory of information value.
INTRODUCTION (1966), Feltham (1968), Mock (1971), and
others have been awkward and unsatisfac-
> The theory of information economics has tory in their results. This has led some to
had little discernible impact on the theory abandon the unidimensional value model in
and practice of management information favor of multiattribute approaches. King
systems design and evaluation, despite and Epstein (1976), and Ahituv (1980) have
large and obvious overlapping interests. each presented operational multiattribute
The economic theory has provided models schemes which maintain little of the sub-
of the transmission and communication of stance of the economic theory.
information (Marschak, 1968; Shannon &
Weaver, 1949), and of the value of an - The major root of the problem with eco-
information system (Marschak, 1971). It nomic information value theory, though, is
has provided models of the optimal choice not its inoperability, but that it is based
from among available information system upon invalid and unrealistic assumptions
components (Marschak, 1971; Mock, 1969), about decision making and how managers
and of the comparative informativeness of utilize information. Consider, as an ex-
information systems (Blackwell, 1953). ample Blackwell's Theorem ( 1953), proba-
However, none of these models has had bly the best known result of information
much influence on MIS. economics. The theorem directly implies
that a more disaggregated information
- Part of the explanation of this unhappy system is always at least as desirable as a
situation is that the theory is difficult to less detailed system (Hilton, 1981). Within
operationalize, because theoretical models the confines of severe assumptions, such as
of information value require large numbers unlimited and costless information proc-
of input parameters that are sometimes essing, this result is valid, but in a more
impossible to estimate. Direct applica- typical managerial setting the validity
tions of the theory by Bedford and Onsi vanishes and the entire point is lost. Thus,
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the limited impact of information eco- or multiple information systems, and the
nomics on our field stems from problems in decisions can be single or multiple. Figure
the theory, rather than in the practice. I illustrates this diversity and indicates
selected references for each type of
In this paper, we shall expand this thesis model.
and set directions for the development of
information value theory that is founded Each decision is framed as a problem which
upon valid and realistic assumptions about involves the choice of an action from a
managerial decision making behavior. We predefined set of alternatives. The utility
do not seek simply an operational model of of any action depends on which state of
information value. Our ultimate objective nature occurs and the utility of each ac-
is to move the economic theory toward tion-state pair is known. The set of states
what Keen calls "a behaviorally grounded is predefined, but the decision maker, who
conception of optimality that meshes the wishes to maximize utility, has only prob-
analytic perspective of optimization sci- abilistic knowledge as to which will occur.
ence with descriptive, pluralistic models of Information in the form of single or mui-
the decision making process, (Keen, 1977). tiple signals from single or multiple in-
We start with a review of developments in formation sources is used to refine the
the economic theory of information value probabi listic knowledge through Bayesian
and a critical examination of underlying revision, which requires that the decision
assumptions about the decision process and maker have detai led knowledge of the
the decision maker. Five major modifica- conditional probability of obtaining each
tions of the economic theory, suggested by different signal given any state of nature.
descriptive models of managerial behavior The refined knowledge of states leads to an
found in other fields of study, are discussed increase in the exi ected uti I ity of action.
in turn. Finally, this entire approach is This gain in expected utility is the defini-
reviewed in a concluding section that il- -tion of the value of the information. It is
lustrates the utility of a behavioral theory an ex ante measure, made before any sig-
of information value. nals are received, actions ore chosen, or
states occur. Thus, it deals in expected
quantities.
ECONOMICS MODELS OF INFOR-
MATION VALUE L. J. Savage, the originator of the funda-
mental axioms upon which the information
> Two distinct schools, one in economics and economics and decision analysis models are
another in statistics, have been concerned based, wrote that his was, "a highly ideal-
with the value of information for more ized theory of the behavior of a 'rational'
than twenty-f ive years (Hirshlei fer, 1973). person with respect to decisions," ( 1954).
*- Information economics and statlstical de- Our concern is with the value of informa-
cision analysis have produced a series of tion to typical managers, with all their
similar models that value information in flaws and imperfections, acting in a more
the context of several restrictive assump- =- realistic, more complex environment. We
tions about the behavior, abi lity, and are attempting to prescribe the variables
knowledge of actors using information. that must be considered to produce a valid
descriptive model of the value of informa-
,- The models of information value vary along >tion to typical managers. Such a model
two dimensions: the complexity of the in- must be founded upon a valid description of
formation source and the number of deci- the managerial use of information, rather
» sions. The information source can be a than upon the sterile, prescriptive assump-







Single Marxchak (1964) Marschak (1964)
Decision Raiffa ( 1970 Mock (1971)
Demski (1972) Arrow (1972)
Multiple Schlaifer ( 1959)
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Marschak and Marschak (1958)
Miyasawa ( 1968) Marschak (1971)
Figure 1. Economics Models of Information Value
AREAS OF MODIFICATION activities which use information can be
classified as some phase of the intelli-
These economics models of information gence-design-choice-review decision proc-value poorly describe the roles of infor- ess (Simon, 1965). Simon writes:
mation in managerial decision making, and
hence poorly reflect the obtainable value Decision making comprises four
of information in typical managerial set- principle phases: finding occasions
tings. The descriptive inadequacies of for making a decision, finding pos-
these models have been organized for dis- sible courses of action, choosing
cussion into five sections. In each, possible among courses of action, and eval-
modifications of the models, as suggested uating past choices. These four
by a reading of other related fields of activities... account for most ofstudy, are indicated. We conclude with what executives do," (Simon, 1977).
some remarks on the di fficulty of imple-
menting such modifications and the ef- Mintzberg's study of the work of five chief
ficacy of this approach. executives reinforces this finding (1973).
All but time spent in ceremonial activities
(12%) and in giving information (8%) is
The Decision Process attributable to one or more phases of de-
cision making.
According to economics models, informa-
tion derives value from its effect on the Witte ( 1972) formally tested for the exis-decision process. This orientation is diffi- tence of different phases in the decision
cult to fault if decision making is inter- process using a sample of 233 decisions to
preted broadly, for almost al I managerial acquire computer equipment. He divided
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each decision process into ten equal time subdecisions, no support for the hypothesis
periods and characterized each activity in was found.
each period as information gathering, al-
ternatives development, alternatives Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret ( 1976)
evaluation, or choice. The evidence sup- also found evidence of cycling through
ported the hypothesis that multiple phases phases during the decision process, in their
exist within the decision process. study of twenty-five strategic decision
processes in different organizatons. They
xThe difficulty with the economics models suggest that cycling is used as a means of
is that they concentrate upon only one comprehending and clarifying complex
phase of decision making, the choice decision processes, and that "the most
among alternative courses of action. They complex and novel strategic decisions seem
assume that an occasion for decision mak- to involve the greatest incidence of com-
ing has been found and that all possible prehension cycles," ( 1976). Evidence was
courses of action and consequences for also found that interrupts, created by
every conceivable course of events have internal and external pressures and by the
been determined. But, by the time these appearance of new options, caused cycling.
assumptions are satisfied, managers have
already used a great deal of Information  -The authors build their findings into an
and expended the majority of their effort elaboration of the simple intelligence-
on the problem (Simon, 1977). As Edwards design-choice model, and posit that intelli-
and Roxburgh ( 1977) have noted, decisions gence is comprised of two routines: deci-
are profoundly affected by information at --sion recognition and diagnosis. Diagnosis is
the intelligence and design phases of the an optional routine used to clarify and
- decision making process. Without infor- 0-define the issues. Decision recognition
mation to identify problems, structure al- occurs when there are sufficient signals
ternatives, and estimate consequences, no about either a crisis, a problem, or an
choice is ever made. opportunity. This categorization of prob-
lems by stimulus was first suggested by
> Economic models of information value Carter (1971) in his study of all strategic
must be expanded to include consideration decisions within one company. The earlier
of these earlier phases, intelligence and theory of Cyert and March ( 1963) suggest-
design, if they are to accurately reflect
ed that decision recognition was always a
»the benefits of information. The final response to problems rather than to per-
phase, review, need not be explicitly mod- ceived opportunities.
eled since it is usually part of the intelli-
gence phase of other decisions, and could >-Pounds (1969) has presented a theoretical
be captured as such in a multiple decision structure for analyzing problem identifi-
model. cation, one type of decision recogni
tion, as
a process of comparing information about
actual conditions against the predictions of
The phase theory of decision making im- a chosen "model" of how things ought to
plies not only that decisions are comprised be. The models managers use are implicit
of different activities, but also that these or explicit derivations from historical and
activities follow a set pattern, a progres- planning data, or models imposed by oth-
sion from initial recognition to implemen- ers, or derived from outside the organiza-
tation of the chosen actions. Witte's evi- tion.
dence does not support the hypothesis that
the phases followed a clear progression. >The design phase of decision making is not
Even when each decision was divided into well understood. Cyert and March ( 1963)
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posit that design is largely a matter of Human Judgment Under
problem-directed search for acceptable Uncertainty
alternative actions. How this search is
accomplished, though, is somewhat less , There are two competing paradigms of how
than clear. information is utilized in judgment and
choice, the Bayesian and the regression
> schools of thought. The essential differ-
ence between the two is in the manner of
> Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret ( 1976) assessment of the relationship between in-
suggest that design activity is very differ_ formation and the states about which one
ent depending upon whether the decision =-is drawing inference. The Bayesians pro-
maker sought a ready-made or a custom- P0se the use of conditional probabi I ities
made solution. They note that search is and Bayes' theorem to assess the impact of
appropriate for ready-made solutions, but information upon prior judgments of the
that more elaborate models are necessary =- states' probabi lity of obtaining. The re-
for the description of the design of cus- gression school, formal ized in the lens
tom-made solutions. Reitman (964) and model proposed by Brunswik ( 1952 & 1956),
Alexander (1979) have further detail on the uses correlations of states with informa-
various forms of design activity. tion signals to weight the importance of
each information signal in the final judg-
ment. After several hundred psychology
studies of human judgment, the rivalry
between the two schools remains intense.In summary, there is general agreement in Despite obvious conceptual overlap, at-the literature that intelligence and design tempts at unifying the two views have metactivities exist as important phases of the with limited success (Slavic & Lichten-
decision process. In addition of some con- stein, 1971).
sideration of the intelligence and design
processes to the model should provide a Mock and Vasarhelyi ( 1978) have attemptedmore accurate evaluation of the manage- to synthesize the lens model of human
- rial uses of information. The exact nature information processing with the economic
of each phase and their order from decision model of information value. Their con-recognition to decision implementation ceptual schema suggests that this may beappears to vary among classes of decisions. accomplished simply by substituting the.- Therefore it may be necessary to bui Id lens rnodel for the Bayesian model of signalspecialized information value models, using utilization. Hilton (1980) has taken a dif-
the general information economics ap- ferent approach toward integrating the twoproach, for different types of decisions or views in an information value model. He
different roles of management. For has absorbed some of the features of hu-
example, using Pounds' model ( 1969) of the man information processing into a Bayesian
process of problem finding as a description view of extending the dimensionality of the
of how managers uti I ize information for utility function to cover each feature. Of
problem finding, one could build a model of course, a utility function with enough di-
the value of information for monitoring. mensions can be made to fit any situation.The general approach to this model would Thus, the complex resultant formulation is
be the same as in information economics, of dubious value.
but the underlying assumptions about
managerial behavior would be more accu- Economics has adhered to the Bayesian
rate and would result in more valid, more view of information utilization ever since
useful, and more usable theory. Savage ( 1954) first joined the concepts of
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utility and subjective probability into a estimates ( 1971,1973, & 1974). The "pros-
formal, axiomatic theory of decision mak- pect theory" they have developed sheds
ing. This is why the economics information considerable light on how outcomes are
value models require that the decision framed as gains and losses in evaluating
maker have knowledge of the prior proba- utilities and on the transient nature of
bilities of states occurring, p(s), and of the these values (1979 & 1981). A model of
conditional probablities of each signal, information value needs to include consid-
p(y I s), for the derivation of p(s I y), the eration of these systematic biases, for they
probabi I ities of each state occurring re- induce a systematic subuti lization of in-
vised upon receipt of signal y. It is a formation, and decrease the obtainable
curious formulation of the decision maker's value of information.
problem, for it is a simpler matter to
produce directly subjective estimates of
p(s I y) in the presence of y, than to esti- The Choice of Actions
mate both p(s) and p(y Is) and apply the
Bayesian revision formula. > Economics information value models re-
quire that the decision maker explore the
Consider, for a moment, weather forecasts consequences of every action, from the
and tomorrow's weather conditions. The potential action set, in every state of na-
forecast is information; it corresponds to ture. The action is chosen which maxi-
y. Tomorrow's weather condition, rain or mizes the expected value of outcomes.
sun, is the uncertain state. Now think of = There is considerable evidence that actions
your favorite weather forecaster and es- are chosen on a much simpler basis.
timate the probability that rain will be
forecast giyen that it will be sunny tomor- > Simon was one of the first to question the
row, p(y i s). An important di fficulty im- maximum expected value model of choice.
mediately arises. The problem is back- > He developed the well known idea of sat-
words to the normal fashion of thinking isficing, and submitted it as a better de-
about information and states. The proba- scription of individual behavior, and as a
bi lity of sun tomorrow, given a forecast of normative model of rational behavior under
rain, p(s·l y), is a more natural assessment, conditions of costly information gathering
because it is chronologically ordered (first and processing (1955, 1956, 1957, & 1959).
an information signal, then an inference He suggested that an action choice rule
about the state), and i t measures the nat- more descriptive of human behavior would
ural notion of reliability of information. be to determine a minimum aspiration
This example illustrates the inadequacy of level, L, for a decision outcome and se-
Bayesian revision as a descriptive theory. quentially search and test potential actions
unti I an action a' is found such that:
> Reformulation of the model to indicate
direct estimation of p(st y) by the decision
maker simplifies the model formulation, MIN u(s,a') > L
but further complications must be consid- s
ered. There is a large and growing body of
psychology I iterature that documents and
theorizes on evidence of systematic bias in In this formulation, u(s,a') need not be
- the estimation of probabilities. Tversky accurately determined; one only needs to
and Kahneman have identified three im- know whether u(s,a') is greater than L, the
portant heuristics by which people esti- level of aspiration. L and u(s,a') could be
mate probabi lities, and have demonstrated multidimensional. Then, the action choice
how these lead to systematic biasing of rule need not be modified, but the chosen
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action a' must satisfy the rule along every Different simplified choice rules could alsodimension. This obviates the need for a be modeled. For example, one could modeltradeoff among dimensions of the objec- the practice of developing plans upon as-
tive. sumptions about most likely future scenar-
ios. This is equivalent to identifying the
> Cyert and March ( 1963) extended this idea most likely state of nature and choosing an
to the theory of the firm, and considerable action to maximize the value of the out-
work has continued in this area of bounded come if that state obtains. The decision
rational theory (March, 1978). Stigler rule would be, chosen a', such that:
( 1961) has explored the economics of the
search activity. Many of these ideas could
simplify a model of information value and u(s',a') = MAX u(s',a)
serve as a better description of decision a
making behavior.
where
Soelberg ( 1966 & 1967) studied the behav- p(s' I y') = MAX p(s  y')ior of fifty-two graduate students making
job decisions. He found evidence that S
individuals had more than one acceptable
choice alternative before ending their
search, in contradiction to strict satisfic- Clearly, the appro'priate model of actionchoice varies among classes of decisions.ing behavior. Soelberg developed a theory , Research has provided some understandingof decision making that combines the no- of when and where different choice strat-tions of maximizing along the most impor-
tant one or two dimensions of outcome and egies ar6 used, but not enough to be able toconstruct one integrated model of actionsatisficing along all others, to explain his ,..choice. Therefore, models of informationfindings. value should be specialized to particularclasses of decisions or types of managerialThe conflict between Simon's and Soel- roles, so that the appropriate action choiceberg's theories of choice behavior can be model may be incorporated.resolved using Mintzberg, Raisinghani, andTheoret's differentiation between ready-
made and custom-made solutions. They Multiple Signal Resolution-write, "The hypothesis with the strongest
support in our study is that the organiza- > There is little evidence that individualstion designs only one fully-developed cus- resolve multiple and possibly conflictingtom-made solution...In contrast, organiza- signals through a complex Bayesian revi-tions that chose ready-made solutions typ- sion process. Even Bayesian psychologistsically selected them from among a number have developed theories about individuals'of alternatives," ( 1976). Soelberg's sample misaggregation of multiple signals to ex-was of decision makers seeking and choos- plain the apparent conservative revision ofing from among ready-made .solutions, job prior probability estimates (Beach, 1968;offers, whereas many of Simon's conclu- Edwards, 1968; Gettys & Manley, 1968;sions appear to have germinated from his Hilton, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974;
observations of problems involving custom- Wheeler & Beach, 1968).made solutions, such as the widely refer-enced description of a computer acquisi- - The regression paradign offers only ation decision made in the early 1950's slightly better description of multiple sig-(Cyert, Simon, Trow, 1956). nal resolution. Summers ( 1962) and
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Dudycha and Naylor ( 1966), studied the -The economists appear to have been trying
utilization of orthoganot information sig- to model the use of historical information
nals, and concluded that the lens model .-in decision making. This might be accom-
provided an accurate description of how plished much more simply if we do not
individuals utilize uncorrelated information distinguish historical information. In this
signals in forming judgments. Brunswik way, the new information signals may em-
( 1956) suggested that intercorrelations body historical information, and the over-
among information signals are the rule wrought complexity of the problem disap-
rather than the exception. His lens model pears.
has been used to evaluate how wei I indi-
viduals are able to make adjustments for The other major modification of the mui-
intercorrelations, by comparing an indi- tiple decision problem has already been
vidual's weighting of signals with regres- suggested in an earlier section. Decision
sion weights. The evidence indicates that problems cannot be defined and enumer-
these adjustments generally are not made ated at the beginning of any period of
very well (Armelius & Armelius, 1976; time. They must be discovered, selected,
Einhorn, 1971; Hayes, 1964; Hoffmann & or assigned with little forewarning. We
Blanchard, 1961; Schmitt & Dudycha, have suggested that this problem identifi-
1975). cation issue can best be described by add-
ing an intelligence phase to the model.
- As with modeling the design phase of the
decision process, the direction to take in
modeling multiple signal resolution is not
clear. Nevertheless, it should be possible CONCLUSIONS
to improve upon the descriptive validity of
the complex Bayesian revision process We have examined the standard economic
adopted by information economics. models of information value and suggested
five major areas of revision that would
move the models toward a behaviorally
Multiple Decisions Over Time grounded theory of information value. Our
suggestions are not radical. These modi-
How do managers deal with information fications would alter the underlying as-
, over time? The economics models assume sumptions about decision making and hu-
that all future decision problems have been man information processing, without
designed at the beginning of a finite time abandoning the general economic frame-
=:. horizon (Feltham, 1972). In this context, work of information valuation.
an information source is valued as the
present value of the expected stream of The review of work in the five major
outcome improvements gained by a deci- revision areas reveals that descriptive
sion maker using information signals op- theories of decison making and human in-
timally. The solution to this problem can formation processing are not wei I under-
only be derived using dynamic program- stood. Competing and conflicting theories
ming, for one must consider the impact of abound, each with its own proponents and
each signal in all future decisions as well its own relevant domain of managerial be-
as in the present decision. It is not the havior. This may lead some to be skeptical
reuse of the information source, but of the of success in bui Iding a revised model and
particular information signals that makes to retreat to standard economic models,
the structure of the model so absurdly but there can be no safe refuge in theory
counter to intuitive notions of managerial which is bui It upon a weak foundation of
behavior. invalid assumptions.
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Rather than retreat, what is necessary is Services, January-February 1966, pp.i that information theory be constructed for 15-22.
particular classes of decision making or Blackwell, D. "Equivalent Comparisons of
managerial action. Then, one need use Experiments," Annals of Mathematical
achieve universal applicabi I ity, but it may Brunswik, E. The Conceptual Framework
only descriptive theory relevant to that Statistics, Volume 24, 1953, pp. 265-
domain. The resultant model will not 272.
provide the theoretical underpinnings to of Psychology, University of Chicago
the solution of an MIS problem. Special- Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1952.
ization should also alleviate some of the Brunswik, E. Perception and the Repr-
operational difficulties encountered when- esentative Design of Experiments, Uni-
ever economic models of information value versity of California Press, Berkeley,
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mentation studies have highlighted the Carter, E. E. "The Behavioral Theory of
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